The ultimate point of origin of the great financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be traced back to an extremely indebted US economy. The collapse of the real estate market in 2006 was the close point of origin of the crisis. The failure rates of subprime mortgages were the first symptom of a credit boom tuned to bust and of a real estate shock. But large default rates on subprime mortgages cannot account for the severity of the crisis. Rather, low-quality mortgages acted as an accelerant to the fire that spread through the entire financial system. The latter had become fragile as a result of several factors that are unique to this crisis: the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. To these novel factors, one must add the now standard failure of regulators and supervisors in spotting and correcting the emerging weaknesses. Accounting data fail to reveal the full extent of the financial maelstrom. Ironically, according to these data, US banks appear to be still adequately capitalized. Yet, bank undercapitalization is the biggest stumbling block to a resolution of the financial crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The most severe financial crisis we are living through since that of the Great Depression has many of the features of a credit-boom-and-bust (CBB for short) crisis. The time line of a CBB crisis goes as follows; see Fisher (1933) , Minsky (1977) , and Kindleberger (1978) . The point of origin of the crisis is a shock (for example, a real estate boom) that alters the profit outlook in the economy. Bank credit, or credit in general, feeds the boom. Households accumulate debt relative to net worth; firms increase leverage to finance new projects based on optimistic assessments of future profits. For Fisher (1933, p. 341), "…over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money." Optimism about the future drives the process of capital and debt accumulation. Monetary expansion comes with or promotes the expansion of bank credit; see Kindleberger (1978, ch. 4) . Surging asset prices feed optimism about future price rises. We can characterize this phase as one of low-risk aversion. Investors are more concerned about what other investors are doing than making their own independent assessment of the situation, that is, they herd.
Then, a shock breaks the boom. The list of possible negative events includes a tightening of monetary policy, a real estate or equity crash, or the failure of a large financial institution. Whatever the disturbance, it deteriorates critically what Minsky (1977) calls the "margin of safety," the excess of assets over liabilities or the excess of positive cash flows over negative cash flows. Now, the future appears dark and anticipated profits decline. Risk aversion surges among investors. Asset prices implode as speculators unload risky assets. Again, referring to Minsky (1982, p. 42) , "[a] recursive process is readily triggered in which a financial market failure leads to a fall in investment which leads to a fall in profits which leads to financial failures, further declines in investment, profits, additional failure, etc." A rush for liquidity and deleveraging follows. With debt liquidation, inflation falls below expectations. Disinflation forces a rise in the real value of debt and debtors suffer a decline in net worth (Fisher 1933, pp. 342-3) . Even without disinflation, declining asset prices lower the value of collateral and force borrowers to put up more security for a given nominal value of debt. Our paper argues that the current crisis has many features of the time line implied by the CBB hypothesis. However, as it is true for other crises, there are some features that are unique to this crisis, such as the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting.
1 These novel aspects have weakened the resilience of the financial system and transformed a crisis of a relatively small segment of the market in the United States into a deep and global one. The attempt of banks to unload risk off balance sheets fired back. The complex products created by the "originate and distribute" banking model ultimately instilled a deep sense of distrust among investors. When those complex products were brought back into the balance sheets, banks booked capital losses, as a result of fair value accounting, and declared write-downs. Banks found themselves undercapitalized and sold assets to reduce leverage; they thus set in motion a vicious circle of asset liquidation and price declines across a vast range of assets. The public's high degree of risk aversion demanded that banks held more capital per dollar of assets, while asset markdowns and write-downs were actually destroying capital. In brief, banks became heavily undercapitalized, reflecting bloated balance sheets, poor quality of the assets, and a distrustful public.
Undercapitalization explains why the crisis persists and governments continue to inject vast amounts of public funds into banks. The crisis is not likely to end until balance sheets will have expurgated socalled toxic assets. Banks will not resume lending until balance sheets will be cleansed and undercapitalization has been overcome. 1 In a series of publications, Paolo Savona and various co-authors have underscored how the introduction of new financial products, but especially derivatives, has altered the nature of money; see, for example, Savona and Maccario (1999) . This aspect of the crisis is a theme in its own right but is beyond the scope of our paper.
The focus of our paper is on banks, specifically what role they have had in sparking the crisis, what actions they have taken in reducing leverage, and how security markets have penalized bank equity. Our account of the behavior of banks falls within the framework of the CBB hypothesis. By design, we ignore several important topics, among which the impact of the crisis on the real economy and on the conduct of monetary policy. Nor do we compare this crisis to others before; on this theme, see Fratianni (2008) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section II argues that the ultimate point of origin of the crisis must be found in a highly indebted US economy. Section III looks at subprime mortgage loans, the close point of origin of the crisis, and the political context that encouraged them. Sections IV examines how the fire spread from a relatively small segment of the real estate mortgage market to security markets worldwide. Section V presents descriptive statistics, drawn from banks' financial statements and security markets, on the breadth and depth of the financial crisis; the essential point there is that accounting data, not surprisingly, are less informative than market data. Summary and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. AN INDEBTED US ECONOMY
Signs that the US economy was on a classic pattern of a big credit boom have been present for quite some time. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of US households' debt over the period . To the growth of total debt we have superimposed the growth of mortgages, which displays a very tight positive correlation with the growth of household debt. The previous credit boom started in the early 1980s, peaked in the middle of the decade and was followed by a deceleration that lasted several years. The current credit book started in the mid 1990s, peaked between the first and second quarter of 2006, and was followed by a credit bust. The difference between the two cycles is due to the evolution of home prices. Figure 2 displays States had net foreign borrowings of $3,455 billion, driven by a large and persistent excess of domestic absorption -the sum of domestic consumption, gross investment, and government spending-over domestic production (BIS 2008, pp. 28-29) . For any other country, the required adjustment would have entailed a contraction of domestic absorption relative to output, a sharp depreciation of the home currency in the exchange markets, and a shift from non-traded goods to traded goods production. But the key role of the dollar in the international monetary system has softened the external constraint of the United States and given it a unique capacity to borrow massive amounts of foreign capital at interest rates that do not imbed a significant degree of credit risk (Alessandrini and Fratianni 2009 forthcoming) . 3 In sum, the U.S. economy, as a whole, was highly leveraged by the time the crisis erupted.
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 1 , here]
III. SUBPRIME MORTGAGES
Subprime mortgages were an innovation of the 1990s, spurred by the demise of usury laws, financial deregulation, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 that gave incentives to lenders to extend loans to individuals with low income and limited or outright poor credit histories (Gramlich 2007) . The Act was accompanied by "regulatory relief." Just to mention an example of the latter, banks had to demonstrate that they were meeting the objectives of the Act by making a certain number of loans to people with low or moderate incomes. Prudence and credit evaluations were replaced by more flexible procedures that justified lending to the targeted clientele (Wallison 2009 and prepayment penalties, were widespread. All of this was driven by the property boom.
The credit boom and the politics of lending led to a progressive deterioration of credit standards Declining lending standards were correlated with rapid home price appreciation, evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the housing boom was driving both the expansion of credit and declining lending standards. Finally, an expansive monetary policy was providing added impetus to a loosening of the standards (Dell'Ariccia et al. 2008, especially p. 18) . The link between CBB and monetary policy is hardly surprising; for a review of the evidence see Berger and Udell (2004) .
IV. SPREADING THE FIRE
Actual and projected bank write-downs on low-quality mortgages represent approximately 25 percent of estimated losses on prime, commercial real estate, and consumer and corporate loans; and 9 percent of the estimated mark-to-market losses on asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized debt rates on subprime mortgages cannot explain the depth of this crisis. Subprime mortgages were the accelerant to the fire after the real estate bust short circuited in the financial house. The fire spread quickly and globally because this house was built with combustible material, such as structured finance and inadequate supervision; a sudden rush for liquidity and fast deleveraging exacerbated by the practice of fair value accounting kept the fire running.
Structured finance
We use the term structured finance to encompass a series of banking and financial innovations aimed at transferring credit risk from individual financial institutions to the market as a whole. The innovation that best characterizes this crisis is the "originate and distribute" bank model, in which banks originate loans or purchase loans from specialized brokers to either sell them in the financial markets or transfer them to a sponsored structured investment vehicle (SIV). The SIV, in turn, packages the loans into residential MBS, commercial MBS, CDOs, and CLOs; all of these financial acronyms may receive a credit risk score by ratings agencies. In addition to the capital provided by the sponsoring institution, the SIV obtains funding by borrowing short term in the commercial paper market and from banks; in other words, they perform a classic maturity transformation. Should the SIV be unable to refinance itself, it can count on a contingency support from its sponsoring bank.
Commercial paper conduit is another off-balance sheet entity that is the product of the new age of finance; it obtains the entire funding from the commercial paper market and invests in trade receivables and other non-tradable assets such as credit cards, consumer loans, automobile loans, and real estate loans. In 2007, SIVs and commercial paper conduits held assets for $1,800 billion (IMF 2008a, Box 2.5).
Two serious problems arise with the practice of structured finance. The first regards the incentive of the originator to screen debtors when the loans are destined to be placed off balance sheet. Reputational considerations would suggest that the originator would not want to compromise its standards. However, the fact that regulators and accounting standards required little disclosure about unconsolidated off-balance sheet entities made these entities opaque to investors and lowered the cost of reputational loss to the sponsoring institution. To complicate matters, the ratings agencies were not up to the task of properly evaluating the new complex products. Errors in judgment were as glaring as assigning the same letter grade to a CDO and a corporate bond with sharply different default rates. 6 The second concerns the contingency that the off-balance sheet entities may be reabsorbed by the sponsoring institution. Balance-sheet absorption can occur either because the sponsoring institution covers more than half of the trading losses of the sponsored SIV or because the sponsoring institution wants to prevent a downgrade of the SIV's credit risk (IMF 2008a, Box 2.6).
At that point, there is a reversal of the intended benefits of "originate and distribute;" namely, risk returns home and regulatory capital rises. The investor, having finally gained transparency in the transaction, may judge correctly that the sponsoring bank is overleveraged and demands for it a higher required return on capital; this translates into a spot drop in the share price of the consolidated bank.
Rush for liquidity
As we have noted, a credit bust typically occurs with a rush for liquidity and a sharp re-pricing of Interest rate spreads are negatively correlated to CBB cycles. Before a crisis, credit risk spreads tend to be low; then they erupt with the onset of a crisis. This pattern happened with a vengeance in the current crisis. Spreads relative to yields on government bonds shot up for commercial paper and nontriple A rated corporate bonds in the United States, the Euro area, and Japan; see IMF (2008b, Figures 4 and 5, pp. 172-3) . 7 The switch in the public's degree of risk aversion was justified by the mounting difficulty of gathering reliable information on opaque clients in times of distress. Confronted with more uncertainty in assessing the true credit status of relatively opaque borrowers, creditors had no better method than applying higher interest rates to entire classes of borrowers.
Fair value accounting
Both GAAP (Generally accepted accounting principles with jurisdiction over US companies) and IFRS (International financial reporting standards with jurisdiction over European companies) prescribe so-called fair valuation for financial assets with a holding period less than maturity. For US entities, debt and equity securities can be classified as either "held-to-maturity," or "trading," or "available-for-sale"
(FAS # 115). The first are reported at amortized cost; the second at fair value, with unrealized gains or losses included in earnings; and the third at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings but included in shareholders' equity. Thus, unrealized gains or losses of trading securities and available-for-sale securities affect owners' capital. 8 As an example, for 2008 Citigroup lists tradingaccount assets of $378 billion and trading-account liabilities of $167 billion, on which it reports unrealized losses of $20.5 billion (Citigroup 2008, p. 117 and p. 119) . 9 Despite restrictions, management can elect to move assets from one category to another. Again using Citigroup as an example, in 2008 $64.9 billion securities were moved out of the "trading-account assets" category, of which $60.3 billion went into the "held-to-maturity" category and $4.6 billion went into the "availablefor-sale investments" category (Citigroup 2008, pp. 86-87 10 However, one must be reasonably sure that the fair value established by the reporting unit were to reflect reliable assumptions about the future net cash flows associated with an asset; in other words, the only source of inefficiency must be due to markets suffering from illiquidity. In practice, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between illiquidity and credit risk.
In sum, fair value accounting has four important implications. The first is that unrealized gains and losses impact owners' capital. The second is that, like for any other accounting rule, fair valuation provides incentives to management to game the rules to boost earnings (or reduce losses) and management bonuses linked to earnings' performance. Thus, during periods of rising asset prices, the incentives will be to move assets into the trading account categories, and conversely during declining asset prices. The third is that when markets become less liquid, valuation models based on internal information become more relevant than valuation models based on observables and the latter more relevant than the use of unadjusted quoted prices. In the presence of patently illiquid markets, an argument can be made that fair values should be based on reliable estimates of future net cash flows.
Finally, the pro-cyclical bias of fair value accounting tends to magnify current financial trends and, consequently, exacerbates a financial crisis (Wallison 2008) . Lower accounting asset values that impact on regulatory capital may trigger management to sell in illiquid markets.
Deleveraging
The big impact of the subprime occurred through the re-pricing of risk across a variety of assets, a scramble for liquidity and a shrinking of balance sheets. Spillovers across markets and a scramble for value accounting aggravates the problem through its pro-cyclical bias. Lower accounting asset prices impact negatively on regulatory capital and may push bankers to engage in liquidation sales that further depress asset prices.
In the end, the required adjustment turned out to be too quick and ultimately government had to step in with rescue plans.
V. WHAT BANKS' ACCOUNTING AND MARKET DATA TELL US ABOUT THE CRISIS
In this section, we address two critical issues. The first is to examine whether banks' financial statements gave us any significant warning value about the impending crisis. The second is to compare the stock markets' reaction to the crisis to the information value of the financial statements and infer from this comparison to what extent the source of the problems was outside the banks' balance sheets.
Leverage is a critical indicator of the risk financial institutions are willing to undertake. ratio before it filed for bankruptcy protection). 13 There are significant differences among European banks, with British, French, German, and Swiss banks having, on average, much higher leverage ratios than Italian banks. German and English banks stand out for having raised their already high leverage up until June 2008. Among Italian banks, Unicredit is the closest to the model of the US investment banks, Deutsche Bank and UBS. In sum, the appetite for risk appeared to be high on both sides of the Atlantic and more in the North of Western Europe than in the South.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5, here]
A second way to investigate whether banks have assumed more risk during the credit boom is to look at the composition of bank loans. The large database of the FDIC on US banks permits us to identify categories of loans that historically have been high in risk. As a broad measure of bank credit risk, we take the ratio of three high-risk loan categories to total assets. The three high-risk categories are real estate loans, credit card loans, and certificates of participation in pools of residential mortgages. Figure 6 plots this credit risk proxy, on a quarterly frequency, from 2002 to 2008 for small, medium, and large banks. Small banks are defined as having total assets less than $100 million; medium banks between $100 million and $1 billion; and large banks with more than $1 billion. We also display the value of the credit risk proxy for the US banking system as a whole.
We consider first large banks, the alleged culprit of the crisis: the bank credit risk proxy rises foreign exchange rate contracts, and notional value of derivatives on equities and other commoditiesas a percent to total bank assets across bank sizes; see Figure 9 . The magnitudes involved here, however, are much higher. At the end of 2008, derivatives at large US banks were booked for 14 We owe this insight to Gregory Udell.
$201,061 billion, 14 times US GDP in current dollars. 15 Small and intermediate banks are not materially engaged in derivatives. In sum, complex finance is done predominantly by large banks.
Given the large sums involved and the off-balance sheet nature of securitization and derivatives, formal financial reporting is bound to deeply understate the true impact of a financial crisis on banks' performance both in market upswings and downswings. Thus, to have a more complete appreciation of the extent of the current financial maelstrom, we need to turn to market data.
For this purpose, we collected equity prices for a sample of banks from three areas of the world: the United States, Western Europe, and the Pacific region. The actual list, shown in the Appendix, includes 42 US banks, 49 banks from 14 different Western European countries, and 26
banks from three different Pacific region countries. 16 The listed banks tend to be large and thus capable of engaging in complex structured finance. We provide three sets of descriptive statistics.
The first, displayed in Figure 10 , are market capitalization values for the three bank-area aggregates.
The second, displayed in Figure 11 , are holding-period dollar rates of return, again for the three bankarea aggregates. The third, shown in Table 2, Over the period July 2007-February 2009 period, the crisis has destroyed $3,000 billion of market values in our sample of banks. European banks were hit the hardest with a 75 percent decline, the Pacific banks were hit the mildest with a 48 percent decline, and US banks fared in the middle with a 68 percent decline; see Figure 10 . The decline, furthermore, was at least twice as large after September 14, 2009 than in the previous sub-period. This is quite apparent from the holding-period rates of return shown in Figure 11 , and corroborates the view that the Lehman failure was perceived by the market as a critical event. Table 2 compares rates of return at the national level, using both local-currency and dollar returns. Dollar returns are the sum of local-currency returns, the rate of dollar depreciation (or appreciation if negative) and the interaction between these two terms. The dollar depreciated relative to most currencies in the pre-Lehman period and appreciated in the post-Lehman period. Take bank stocks of the euro area. In the pre-Lehman period, rates of return in the euro area average -59 percent, over a range comprised between -42 percent for Austria and -92 percent for Portugal. Banks from France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal do worse than banks from Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
In the post-Lehman period, the euro average rate of return falls by an astounding -196 percent, over a range comprised between -88 percent for Spain and -391 percent for Ireland. Austrian, Belgian, German and Irish banks do much worse than French and Southern European banks. As we have already remarked in connection with dollar valuation, European bank stocks suffer the most, Pacific region bank stocks the least, and US bank stocks are in the middle. For most countries, but not for the United Kingdom, the differences between local-currency returns and dollar returns are of a small order of magnitude.
This massive destruction of market value can be attributed only in part to deteriorating fundamentals. As predicted by the CBB hypothesis, the crisis has made investors much more risk averse. To illustrate the extent of this shift in risk aversion, Figure 12 [Insert Figure 12 , here]
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the ultimate point of origin of the great financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a credit boom that manifested itself in an extremely indebted US economy and in a high appetite for risk by investors. The collapse of the real estate market in 2006 was the close point of origin of the crisis. The failure rates of subprime mortgages were the first symptom of a credit boom tuned to bust and of a real estate shock. But large default rates on subprime mortgages cannot account for the severity of the crisis. Rather, low-quality mortgages acted as an accelerant to the fire that spread through the entire financial system. The latter had become fragile as a result of several factors that are unique to this crisis: the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. To these novel factors, one must add the more standard failure of regulators and supervisors in spotting and correcting the emerging weaknesses.
The banks' strategy of unloading risk off balance sheets fired back when investors finally became aware of the complexity underlying various asset backed securities; these investors reacted with a sharp increase in risk aversion. As these securities were brought back into the balance sheets, banks had to declare writedowns or book capital losses in accordance with the principles of fair value accounting. Falling capital values fueled additional anxiety in investors who were scared by bloated balance sheets and wanted instead less debt and more capital. Banks reacted by selling assets to reduce leverage, setting in motion a vicious circle of asset liquidation and price declines across a vast range of assets. Financial integration made possible for the crisis to spread virtually worldwide.
We examined accounting data to see whether they could offer any significant warning value about the impending crisis. We used four different metrics of risk taking: leverage, risk quality of bank loans, securitization, and derivatives. Leverage for US investment banks was much higher than for US commercial banks. Not surprisingly, of the five US large investment banks, only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have survived and both have changed business models since the start of the crisis. But leverage was also very high for some British, French and German universal banks. The point is that appetite for risk was high on both sides of the Atlantic. Risk quality of US loans, based on our credit risk proxy, deteriorated throughout the credit boom. While large banks contributed the most in an absolute sense, small and medium-size banks did just as well (or badly) in a proportionate sense. Large US banks instead were practically alone in engaging in large amounts of securitization and derivatives.
These are the areas where the risks are likely to be deepest and yet least transparent.
Accounting data have severe limitations in revealing the full extent of this financial maelstrom.
To illustrate, according to reported accounting data, the US banking system does not yet appear Banks' undercapitalization explains why the crisis persists and why governments continue to inject vast sums of public funds into banks. The crisis is not likely to end until balance sheets will have expurgated so-called toxic assets. Banks will not resume lending until balance sheets will have been cleansed and undercapitalization has been overcome. The greatest challenge may well be for politicians to convince an enraged public of the necessity of either further injections of funds into the banking systems or to undertake outright nationalizations. In the 1990s, Japan paid very dearly, with a so-called lost decade, for delaying the recapitalization of the banking system. The financial crisis in Japan started in 1991 and was induced by a real estate boom pierced by a tightening of monetary policy. The crisis was most severe from the middle of 1994 to 1996; there was a reoccurrence in 1997.
Legislation to use public funds to recapitalize the banks was passed only in February of 1998 (Nakaso 2001, p. 11 ). Public's hostility to use taxpayers' funds was the main reason for the costly delay.
With the unwinding of the crisis, there will be a great flurry of proposals aimed at closing various regulatory loopholes that have spurred banks to take excessive risk taking. While this paper has purposefully avoided the topic of regulation and supervision, we like to point out that regulatory failure does not emerge in a vacuum (Fratianni 2008) . If serious reforms have to be undertaken, the relationship between the legislator-principal and the regulator-agent must be at the top of the agenda. Regulators, like central banks, would perform better if they were given clear and nonconflicting objectives, made independent of the executive branch of government, and rendered accountable to the principal. Such independence could be made formal by a legislative act that would spell out the objectives of regulation and, at the same time, make the regulators accountable through periodic reporting to the Congress or the Parliament, as it is the currently the case for some central banks. Legend: LCU = rate of return in local-currency units, EXC = depreciation/appreciation of the US dollar relative to the local currency, USD = rate of return in dollars, AT=Austria, BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Danmark; ES=Spain; FR=France; GR=Greece; IE=Eire; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States. Source: Bloomberg.
